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Last Chance Agreements: How Many
Chances is an Employee Entitled To?
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters'
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, a large number of cases involving labor issues have gone to
arbitration. Of these labor cases, a distinct sub-category are those governed by the
Railway Labor Act (RLA). 2 In labor cases, including those governed by the RLA,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the strong federal policy in favor of
arbitration. Furthermore, courts have consistently held that great deference must
be shown toward the arbitrator when reviewing an arbitration award. However,
there are still issues that arise as to just how much deference should be afforded to
an arbitrator's decision and when a court can overturn an arbitration award. In
Continental, the Fifth Circuit addresses both of these issues.
3
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In March 2003, Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental) brought action
against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) in the Southern District
of Texas.4 Continental sought to vacate an arbitration award under the RLA,
which reinstated an employee who was terminated for violating a last chance
agreement (LCA) after testing positive for alcohol. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of IBT and Continental in turn appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 6 On appeal, Continental sought to have the
arbitration award vacated based on the following three reasons:
(1) the district court applied the wrong standard of review under the
RLA; (2) the district court erred in upholding the award because the
Board exceeded its authority, by ignoring the plain language of the
agreements and by substituting its judgment for that of the EAP director;
and, (3) even if the award were otherwise proper, the district court should
have vacated it as violative of public policy.
7
1. 391 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2004).
2. See Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
3. Continental, 391 F.3d at 613.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 614-16. See RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 151.
6. Continental, 391 F.3d at 613.
7. Id. at 616.
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In this case, aircraft mechanic Mark Johnson worked at Continental.! In Au-
gust 2000, Johnson was selected for a random alcohol test.9 Following the test, he
was fired from Continental because he had more than the legal limit of alcohol in
his system. 10 Johnson subsequently filed a grievance contesting his discharge.
1
With the assistance of IBT, Johnson entered into an LCA with Continental.' 2
Johnson was permitted to return to work at Continental provided he satisfied the
terms of the LCA.' 3 Per the terms of the agreement, Johnson would be terminated
for any use of alcohol. 14 The agreement specifically included mouthwash and any
other medications or substances which might contain alcohol. 15 The only excep-
tion was for physician-prescribed medication.16 If a physician prescribed medica-
tion for Johnson, he was required to inform the Employee Assistance Program
(EAP) staff.17 On March 20, 2001, Johnson left a voice mail message for Conti-
nental's EAP director, stating that he was taking over-the-counter cough medi-
cine.' 8 Two days later Johnson was selected for another random alcohol test and
again tested positive. t9 Once again Continental terminated Johnson and once
again he filed a grievance protesting his termination. 20 The arbitrators, known as
the System Board (Board), held an evidentiary hearing on Johnson's grievance.21
The Board found that Johnson had not violated the LCA agreement and ordered
Continental to reinstate Johnson.2 2 Following the Board's findings, Continental
filed suit in district court, seeking to have the arbitration award vacated.23
On appeal, Continental put forth three arguments. 24 First, Continental con-
tended that the district court applied the wrong standard of review under the
RLA. 25 Second, Continental argued that the district court erred in upholding the
award because the Board exceeded its authority.2 6 Finally, Continental alleged
8. Id. at 615.





13. Id. The LCA required that Johnson do the following: (1) be evaluated by Continental's EAP
director; (2) complete rehabilitation, if deemed necessary by the EAP director; (3) submit a resignation
letter to the EAP director to be used if he did not satisfy the terms of the LCA; (4) agree to be termi-
nated if he failed a drug or alcohol test; (5) agree to random drug and alcohol testing; and (6) complete





18. Id. at 616. The EAP director received the message, but he never contacted Johnson about it. Id.
19. Id. Johnson's BAC was .04 at 12:40 p.m. Id. His confirmation test at 1:05 p.m. showed a BAC
of .029. Id.
20. Id. at 616.





26. Id. Continental claims that the Board ignored the plain language of the agreements and substi-
tuted its judgment for that of the EAP director. Id.
TfivrbN 4C) "'' Pir UY DrTEL REESOLI aVl
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that even if the award were otherwise proper, the district court should have va-
cated it as violative of public policy.
27
The Fifth Circuit rejected Continental's first argument that the court was not
28to give deference to the arbitrator's award. Instead, the court held the standard
of review to be used was that of deference to the arbitrator, thus upholding the
district court's decision. 29 However, as to the second point of argument, the court
found that the Board's interpretation of the agreement was not "an arguable con-
struction of the agreement.",30 Therefore, the court found that the Board had ex-
ceeded the scope of its jurisdiction and vacated the award. 31 Based on its findings,
the court determined it was unnecessary to further address other points which
Continental had argued.32 The court reversed the district court, rendered summary
judgment in favor of Continental, vacated the arbitration award and reinstated
Continental's discharge of Mark Johnson.
33
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has long championed arbitration as the preferred method
of resolving labor disputes.34 In the 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court held
that, as an arbitrator's award 'draws its essence' from the collective bargaining
agreement, courts should not review the merits of the award.35 Additionally, since
the 1980s, it has been well established that questions of arbitrability should be
resolved with a healthy regard for the federal policy which favors arbitration. 36 In
1985, the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi stated that, as with any other contract, the
parties' intentions control. Those intentions, however, are generously construed
as to issues of arbitrability.3 8 Two years later, in Perry,39 the Supreme Court went
on to say that due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration,
and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself should be resolved
in favor of arbitration. 4° In Volt,4' the Supreme Court further clarified the federal
27. Id. at 616. The appellate court found it unnecessary to address this argument. Id. at 620.
28. Id. at 619.
29. Id. The RLA governs disputes between airline carriers and their employees. Id. at 616. RLA
establishes mandatory procedures for the resolution of disputes. Id. Minor disputes are to be resolved
through binding arbitration before a board established by the union and the employer. Id. at 617.




34. Richard A. Bales, The Arbitrability of Side and Settlement Agreements in the Collective Bargain-
ing Context, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 575 (2003).
35. Id. See also United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
36. Volt Info. Scis., Inc., v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476
(1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
37. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
38. Id.
39. Perry, 482 U.S. at 483.
40. Id. at 492 n.9.
41. Volt, 489 U.S. at 468.
20051
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policy with regard to private arbitration agreements.42 In that case, the court held
that there is "no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of proce-
dural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to
their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.""
In determining whether claims may be arbitrated, the Court asks whether the
parties agreed to submit the claims to arbitration." The Court has made clear that
throughout any analysis of whether a particular claim is subject to arbitration, it
should be kept in mind that federal policy strongly favors arbitration.45 Absent
some ambiguity in the agreement, it is the language of the contract that defines the
scope of disputes subject to arbitration. 46 Even so, the pro-arbitration policy does
not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties.47 While courts
are to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts, they
should "not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.
' 48
Because federal policy guarantees the enforcement of private contractual ar-
rangements, courts look first to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute to
determine the scope of the agreement, rather than looking at general policy
goals.49
Clear contractual language governs a court's interpretation of arbitration
agreements. 50 Volt and Mastrobuono both direct courts to respect the terms of the
agreement without regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration. Because there
is a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,5 ' the parties will be bound by their
agreement to arbitrate.5 In Mitsubishi, the court states that if the parties have
made the bargain to arbitrate, then they should be held to that bargain.
53
The Supreme Court has found employment contracts, except for those cover-
ing workers engaged in transportation, to be covered by the FAA.54 The Supreme
Court also makes clear that the Section 1 exemption is confined to transportation
workers. 55 These workers are covered by the provisions of the Railway Labor Act
(RLA) of 1934.56 The RLA was enacted by Congress to promote the stability in
labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolv-
ing labor disputes.57 According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the RLA is
to provide a framework for peaceful settlements of labor disputes between carriers
42. Id.
43. Id. at 476.
44. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
45. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Painewebber Inc. v. Chase Manhattan
Private Bank (Switzerland), 260 F.3d 453, 462 (5th Cir. 2001). The court stated that in determining
whether parties have agreed to submit a particular dispute to arbitration, the courts must keep in mind
the strong federal policy favoring arbitration and resolve all ambiguities in favor of arbitration. Id.
46. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995).
47. EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002).
48. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478. The purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so. Id.
49. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625-26.
50. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62.
51. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
52. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
53. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
54. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
55. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 105; 9 U.S.C. § 1.
56. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
57. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994).
[Vol. 2
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and their employees.58 Even though the RLA governs disputes in the transporta-
tion industry, the federal courts have often looked to the FAA for guidance even
in labor arbitration cases.
59
In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court stated that the function of the
courts was limited in cases where the parties had agreed to submit questions of
contract interpretation to an arbitrator. 6° The Supreme Court went on to state that
whether the moving party was right or wrong was a question of contract interpre-
tation for the arbitrator. 61 It has long been held by the Supreme Court that a labor
arbitrator's award is final if it "draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. ' '62 Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that a mere ambiguity in
the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that the arbitra-
tor may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the
award.63 The Supreme Court reasoned that since arbitration is a creature of con-
tract, the parties should receive the arbitral decision for which they bargained.
64
In other words, because arbitration is purely a product of contract, the arbitrator's
authority is derived exclusively from the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by the parties.65
Courts have consistently held that the standard of review which a court must
apply when reviewing an arbitration award is that of deference to the arbitrator.
As the Eighth Circuit stated in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, a court's "re-
view of arbitration awards is exceptionally narrow.",66  Where parties have an
agreement to resolve disputes via arbitration, courts must defer to the resolution
reached by the arbitrator who typically has special knowledge of the arena in
which the dispute arose. 67 Even if a court is convinced that an arbitrator has
committed serious error, it cannot overturn his decision if he even arguably con-68
strues or applies the contract and acts within the scope of his authority. It is not
for the courts to decide whether the arbitrator properly interpreted the contract.
The arbitrator must look to the "essence" of the agreement. 69 The "essence" test is
58. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601,609 (1959).
59. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 41 n.9 (1987). Although the
Arbitration Act does not apply to "contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce," federal courts often look to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases. Id.
See 9 U.S.C. § I. This has been especially true after the Supreme Court held that the Labor Manage-
ment Act of 1947 empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern
"[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization" under the federal
labor laws. Id. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
60. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68.
61. Id. at 568.
62. Bales, supra note 34, at 581.
63. Id. (quoting Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 598).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 584. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974) (stating that an
arbitrator "has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the
parties"); Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 545, 557-59 (1967) (stating that "parties typically call on an arbitrator to construe and not to
destroy their agreement").
66. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 959 F.2d 1438, 1440
(8th Cir. 1992).
67. Id.
68. Id. See also Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.
69. Amy Evans Roman, Labor Relations - Review of Arbitration Awards - Fifth Circuit Holds That
Since an Arbitrator Implicitly Found Just Cause for Termination a Remedy Other Than Termination
2005]
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met when the award has "a basis that is at least rationally inferable ... from the
letter or purpose" of the collective bargaining agreement.70 The "essence" stan-
dard is interpreted expansively, rather than restrictively, to uphold awards.7'
Although the scope of review of an arbitrator's award is sharply limited, there
are some circumstances where a court can overturn an arbitration decision.
72
These limited circumstances include: (1) when the arbitrator ignores the plain
language of the contract, and (2) when the arbitrator dispenses his own brand of
justice.73 When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to these obligations, a
court should refuse to enforce the award. 74 Judicial review of a labor-arbitration
decision by a court is extremely limited.75 The Supreme Court has afforded great
deference to labor arbitration because of the long-standing federal policy favoring
resolution of labor disputes through the arbitration process.76 If the arbitrator is
"even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of
his authority the fact that a court is convinced that he committed serious error does
not suffice to overturn that decision.,
77
Returning to the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court not only estab-
lished the presumption of arbitrability and the limited judicial review of arbitral
awards, it also created a broad definition of what was meant by a collective bar-
gaining agreement.78 The Supreme Court stated that the collective bargaining
agreement encompasses the whole employment relationship. 79 Consistent with
this view of collective bargaining agreements, courts and arbitrators have found
"that custom, past practice, and oral understandings may . . . constitute an en-
forceable part of the collective bargaining agreement itself.,
80
Side agreements are also enforceable as part of a collective bargaining
agreement. Side agreements include a settlement agreement, a last chance agree-
ment, a second chance agreement, a waiver agreement, a supplemental agreement,
and an addendum. The side agreement serves to clarify, add to, or change the
collective bargaining agreement in some manner.81 Thus, the side agreement
becomes a part of the original collective bargaining agreement.82
was Beyond the Scope of the Power Given to the Arbitrator by the Collective Bargaining Agreement:
Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 69 . AiR L. & CoM. 501,503 (2004).
70. Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 66, 71 F.3d 179,
183 (5th Cir. 1995).
71. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. 776 v. Texas Steel Co., 538 F.2d 1116,
1121 (5th Cir. 1976).
72. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 959 F.2d at 1440.
73. Id. See also Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
74. Id.
75. Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc., v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 343 F.3d 401,405 (5th Cir. 2003).
76. Pan Am. Airways Corp. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 206 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18 (D.D.C. 2002).
See also Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987) "[Tlhe court made clear almost 30 years ago that the courts play
only a limited role when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator.. .The federal policy of settling
labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the
awards." Id. at 36.
77. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.
78. Bales, supra note 34, at 586.
79. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
80. Bales, supra note 34, at 586. See also Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 630 (Marlin
M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997).




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2005, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2005/iss2/7
Last Chance Agreements
The LCA should be regarded as a side agreement to the collective bargaining
agreement.83 LCAs constitute formal contractual agreements of labor disputes,
and so the standard of review is no different from that of any other contract. In
fact, because the LCA is created after the collective bargaining agreement, it may
supersede the collective bargaining agreement in whole or in part.84 The Eighth
Circuit, in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, determined that the arbitrator was
required to view the express provisions of the LCA as representing the parties'
actual intentions with respect to that individual employee.8 The Sixth Circuit, in
Ohio Edison, ruled that an arbitrator does not have the authority to disregard the
explicit terms of an LCA.86 The Fifth Circuit, in Cooper Natural Resources,
stated that an LCA is considered to form a firm contract between the employer
and the employee. 87 It functions as a supplement to the collective bargaining
agreement and is binding upon the arbitrator.88 When an arbitration panel ignores
the explicit terms of an LCA, its decision is owed no deference and must be
closely scrutinized. 89 The Supreme Court has stated that the arbitrator "does not
sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice." 90 This does not mean how-
ever, that an arbitrator's decision interpreting an LCA is entitled to any less defer-
ence than one which is interpreting a collective bargaining agreement. 9' In fact,
an arbitrator's interpretation of both a collective bargaining agreement and an
92LCA are entitled to the same high standard of deference.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the court addresses two issues: (1) determining the appro-
priate standard of review to be used when reviewing the Board's award; 93 and (2)
determining whether the district court erred in upholding the arbitration award.94
In determining the appropriate standard of review, the court first distin-
guished between when an arbitration panel interprets an LCA and when it actually
ignores the existence of an LCA.95 The court then determined that a deferential
standard of review which applies when an arbitration panel interprets a provision
of a collective bargaining agreement, also applies when an arbitration panel inter-
prets a provision of the LCA.96 However, Continental argued that the court should
use a "no deference" standard of review based on the Cooper Natural Resources
decision. 97 Nevertheless, the court went on to find that there was nothing in the
83. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 351 v. Cooper Nat. Resources, Inc., 163 F.3d 916, 919
(5th Cir. 1999).
84. Id.
85. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 959 F.2d at 1440.
86. Ohio Edison Co. v. Ohio Edison Joint Council, 947 F.2d 786, 787 (6th Cir. 1991).
87. Cooper Nat. Resources, 163 F.3d at 919.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
91. Continental, 391 F.3d at 618.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 616.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 618-19.
96. Id. at 619.
97. Id. at 617.
2005]
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Cooper Natural Resources decision which supported a more searching review of
an arbitrator's interpretation of an LCA.98
In this case, the court looked at the Board's interpretation of the LCA,
whereas in the Cooper Natural Resources case, the arbitrator did not even attempt
to interpret the LCA, but had simply ignored it.99 The court determined that the
standard used to review the arbitrator's interpretation of the LCA was the same
standard used for collective bargaining agreements.1°° Therefore, the court held
that the standard of review which was applicable in this case was that of deference
to the Board's decision.' 0' The court adopted the same standard of review the
Supreme Court applied in Misco.10 2 Based on this holding, the court concluded
the deference which the lower court gave to the Board's award was proper.
10 3
In determining whether the district court erred in upholding the arbitration
award, this court looked at whether the Board exceeded the scope of its jurisdic-
tion.1°4 The court found the Board ignored the plain terms of the LCA.' °5 Even
though the employee did not adhere to the terms of the LCA, the Board granted
him yet another "last chance."' 6 The court determined the Board's interpretation
was not even an arguable construction of the LCA and therefore, the Board had
exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction. 10 7
V. COMMENT
In this case, Johnson simply did not follow the terms of the LCA which he
signed. The name of the agreement, 'last chance agreement,' indicated that it was
Johnson's last chance. The LCA stated that if Johnson did not adhere to the con-
ditions of the LCA, he would be immediately terminated without further proceed-
ings. 10 8 The LCA Johnson signed had specific requirements which Johnson was
required to follow in order to continue working at Continental.1 9
Johnson was initially discharged after he tested positive for alcohol in August
2000.110 However, Continental was willing to give him one more chance, if he
agreed to certain specific terms set forth in the LCA."' Johnson agreed to abide
by those terms and, on that basis, Continental allowed him to retain his position as
a mechanic." 2 Continuing to work for Continental was a privilege for Johnson,
not a right. Continental could have refused to permit him to return to work after
98. Id. at 618.
99. Id.; Cooper Nat. Resources., 163 F.3d at 919.
100. Continental, 391 F.3d at 619.
101. Id. The court held that the standard of review applicable in this case was the deferential standard




105. Id. at 620.
106. Id.
107. Id.




112. Id. at 615-16.
[Vol. 2
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he tested positive for alcohol. The company elected to give him an opportunity to
continue working, albeit under the restrictive terms specified in the LCA." 3
By its nature, an LCA is more restrictive than a collective bargaining agree-
ment. LCAs typically come into existence when an employee could be fired un-
der the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, but the company agrees to
give the employee one more chance. This opportunity is normally based on the
employee's agreement to heightened restrictions on their activities.
In this particular case, because Johnson had tested positive for alcohol during
a random alcohol test, Continental was concerned about having a drunk mechanic
working on its airplanes. 1 4 In his position as an aircraft mechanic, Johnson's
improper actions could potentially affect the lives of hundreds of people through
poor maintenance on Continental airplanes. This surely was a factor when Conti-
nental drafted an LCA with zero tolerance for alcohol consumption." 5 There
were numerous reasons Continental could not have Johnson intoxicated while at
work again. Because Johnson was an aircraft mechanic, Continental likely had to
worry about improper maintenance, public perception, and the chance of receiving
a violation from the Federal Aviation Administration for knowingly having an
intoxicated mechanic working on its airplanes. Continental had much to lose if
Johnson was ever drunk again at work. Continental drew a clear line that Johnson
would be terminated if he tested positive again for alcohol, no matter what his
excuse was. l1 6 Per the terms of the LCA, the only time Johnson could take an
alcohol-based medication was if the medication was prescribed by a doctor. 1 7
Because the LCA was so specific about this, it was obviously an important ele-
ment in Continental's decision to allow Johnson to continue working at Continen-
tal. In the LCA, it specifically stated that Johnson could only take alcohol-based
medications if they were prescribed by a physician." 8 The language in the LCA
was very explicit; it was simple, straightforward and unambiguous.
Some people may feel sorry for Johnson because the LCA is more harsh than
the collective bargaining agreement, but those were the terms agreed to by the
parties. It did not matter whether Johnson really was sick and taking the cough
syrup or if he was taking it just for the alcohol content. t9 Johnson was well aware
of the terms of the LCA, he agreed to be bound by those terms, and it was his
responsibility to adhere to those terms. Johnson knew the consequences of not
being faithful to the terms of the LCA. He made the decision to take the medi-
cine, knowing that he risked losing his job. If Continental had wanted to continue
to adhere to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement only, then they
would not have had Johnson sign the LCA. Continental demanded the additional
constraints on his activities or they would not have permitted him to return to
work. 
20






119. It is not unusual for an alcoholic to take alcohol-based medicines in an attempt to 'get a buzz.'
120. Continental, 391 F.3d at 615.
2005]
9
Birkhofer: Birkhofer: Last Chance Agreements
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Court's standard of review of the arbitration award
The first issue the appellate court addressed in this case was to determine the
proper standard of review when reviewing an award set by the Board.' 21 The
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between an airline carrier and its employ-
ees is governed by the RLA. 2 2 The RLA establishes mandatory procedures for
the resolution of both major and minor disputes. 23 A minor dispute includes the
interpretation or application of agreements covering rules or working condi-
tions. 124 A dispute arising out of the enforcement of an existing CBA is an exam-
ple of a minor dispute. 25 In this case both Continental and IBT explicitly agreed
that this dispute constituted a minor dispute under the RLA. 126 Pursuant to the
RLA, because this was a minor dispute it must be resolved through binding arbi-
tration before a board established by the union and the employer."' In fact, the
RLA expressly mandates that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate
these claims in order to achieve the prompt settlement of minor disputes. 28 The
RLA provides that judicial review of Board decisions be narrow and highly defer-
ential because of the strong public policy interest in achieving finality in an arbi-
tration proceeding. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated in numerous cases
that review under the RLA is 'among the narrowest known to the law.' 2 9 Thus,
the Supreme Court affords the utmost deference to the Board's decision.' 
30
However, in this case, Continental argued for a "no deference" standard.' 31
Continental alleged that the no deference standard was appropriate because this
dispute involved an LCA and because the Board ignored an express term of the
agreement. 13 2 The appellate court found the no deference standard to be inappro-
priate because the issue in this case was still the arbitrator's interpretation of the
LCA. 133 Even though the Board appeared to have ignored some of the provisions
of the LCA, it did not ignore the LCA itself.134 The way the Board chose to inter-
pret the LCA was to ignore certain express terms written in it.' 35 Even though the
Board may have used an incorrect method to interpret the LCA, it was an inter-
121. Id. at 616.
122. Id. The purpose of having the RLA govern disputes between airline carriers and their employ-
ees, is to avoid interruptions to commerce that might arise from such disputes. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
123. Continental, 391 F.3d at 616.
124. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Lab. Exec. Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 303 (1989).




129. Slader v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 2001 WL 1640054 at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2001).
130. See Pan Am. Airways, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
Given the long-standing federal policy favoring resolution of labor disputes through the arbitra-
tion process, the Supreme Court has afforded deference to labor arbitration. As a result, a district
court's authority to review labor arbitration awards is extremely limited under the Railway Labor
Act, yielding to the parties' intent to be bound by the arbitrator's interpretation and construction
of their collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 18.
131. Continental, 391 F.3d at 617-18.
132. Id. at 617.
133. Id. at 619.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 617.
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pretation nevertheless. Therefore, because it was an interpretation, the appellate
court held that the standard of review to be applied was that of great deference to
the decision of the Board.
13 6
The practice of affording a high level of deference to the decisions of the
Board normally works well in the transportation industry. The transportation
industry in general, and the airline industry in particular, is quite different from
most other industries. Many of the issues and problems are unique to the trans-
portation or airline industry. For example, an airline is constantly trying to strike
the balance between making money, treating employees fairly, adhering to Federal
Aviation Administration regulations, and, most importantly, running a safe airline.
Needless to say, there are several public policy issues at play in a case such as this
one. Primarily, how are the needs for public safety balanced with the Supreme
Court mandate of great deference to the Board?
The complex system that is in place to resolve disputes in the airline industry
is encompassed in the RLA. 13 7 This system has been in place for decades, en-
compassing all of the different subsets of the transportation industry. The mem-
bers of the Board which arbitrate disputes within the airline industry have typi-
cally been involved in the industry for many years and therefore, are intimately
familiar with the various competing public policy issues at play. Because the
Board members tend to have a high level of expertise in this complex industry,
affording a high degree of deference to the Board when reviewing an arbitration
award makes sense. Courts simply do not have the background and expertise that
the Board members typically have. Additionally, the system has been in place for
a long period of time, so both sides know what to expect to a certain extent.
Because of the complex system of regulations that must be adhered to, nu-
merous public policy issues, collective bargaining agreements between the com-
pany and several unions, the general uncertainty and upheaval in the airline indus-
try at this time, and even public perception; in most cases, the best decisions will
come from those who truly understand the complexities of the industry, rather
than from a judge who only has a general knowledge of the industry. However,
because public safety is involved, the Board's decision should be subject to some
level of review. The standard of deference to the Board's decision should be high,
but the deference to the Board should not be so high that an airline is unable to set
parameters with regards to how to best run it's company safely.
B. Did the district court err in upholding the arbitration award?
The next issue the court addressed was whether the district court erred in up-
holding the arbitration award. 38 Courts will uphold arbitration awards, even if
"wrong" or "questionable" as long as it's the arbitrator's interpretation of the con-
136. Id. at 619.
137. See RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
138. Continental, 391 F.3d at 619.
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tract.' 39 Seldom does a court overturn an arbitration award, but this was that rare
case. 140
The arbitrator's responsibility is to uphold the bargain that the two parties
agreed to, not to decide what is just or unjust. It does not matter whether the LCA
is fair or unfair to the parties involved. It was the bargain that the parties struck.
In this particular LCA, the terms were explicitly spelled out.14 1 The Board com-
pletely disregarded those explicit terms in its interpretation.1 42 When the Board
chose to disregard clear, unambiguous language in the LCA, it seemed to be ap-
plying its "own brand of justice."
Continental contends that the Board exceeded its authority. 43 "In order to be
within the Board's authority, the award must 'draw its essence' from the LCA.'
44
In the LCA, it specifically states that Johnson was not to use anything that con-
tained alcohol, including medications. 45 The ONLY exception was if a doctor
prescribed the medication. 46 In that event, Johnson was required to inform the
EAP staff of the medication he was taking. 47 Contrary to these unambiguous
terms in the LCA, the Board found that a person on the doctor's staff authorizing
Johnson to take the over-the-counter cough syrup, "met the letter and spirit" of the
agreement. 148 Additionally, the Board found that the EAP director should have
called Johnson back and warned him that the use of the cough medicine could
potentially violate the agreement.
49
Johnson was an adult with a responsible job. If he had any questions about
the terms of the LCA, he was perfectly capable of asking someone himself. More
importantly, there was nothing in the LCA that made it Continental's responsibil-
ity to give Johnson yet another warning. 50 Johnson had already been put on no-
tice as to what his responsibilities were when he signed the LCA. The Board
"added a 'last chance warning' requirement to ... the LCA by determining that
the EAP director should have contacted Johnson regarding his voicemail."' 5' In
Misco, the Supreme Court held that "an arbitrator's award is to be upheld as long
as the arbitrator 'is even arguably construing or applying the contract."'' 52 The
Board determined that Johnson was in compliance with the LCA because he had
talked to someone on the doctor's staff and had left a message on the EAP direc-
tor's voicemail. 53 However, it is uncontested that Johnson's doctor did not ap-
prove the use of the cough medicine, as required by the LCA. 54 Because the
139. See E. Assoc. Coal, 531 U.S. at 62 ("courts will set aside the arbitrator's interpretation of what
their agreement means only in rare instances").
140. Id.
141. Continental, 391 F.3d at 615.
142. Id. at 620.
143. Id. at 619.
144. Id. See also Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.
145. Continental, 391 F.3d at 615.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 619.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 620.
151. Id.
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Board did not require proof of a doctor's order, the appellate court found that the
Board's interpretation effectively read the word 'doctor' out of the agreement.,
55
The court found the Board's interpretation was "not an arguable construction of
the agreement."' 156 Even though the standard of review is one of extreme defer-
ence to the Board, the Board cannot read explicit terms out of the agreement.'
57
Because the Board's interpretation failed to arguably construe the agreement, the
court held the Board had exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction in fashioning its
award. 1
58
The appellate court was correct in overturning the district court's decision.
The Board erred in not upholding the terms of the LCA. Airlines have to balance
helping employees who have alcohol problems with other issues such as following
Federal Aviation Administration regulations and keeping the public safe when
they are flying on their airplanes. The airlines do this by drafting stringent LCAs
which retain tight control over the activities of that particular employee. The LCA
normally includes such requirements as mandatory rehabilitation programs and
random alcohol testing. The employee must comply with these terms, not just to
keep the employer happy, but to ensure the safety of those flying on the com-
pany's airplanes. The employee knows when he signs the LCA that he will be
fired immediately for non-compliance with the terms of the agreement. An airline
needs to be able to control the conduct of an employee who has exhibited signs of
alcohol problems. An LCA helps an airline do this.
A person has additional responsibilities when he chooses to work in the
transportation industry, specifically in the capacity of an aircraft mechanic at a
major airline. When an aircraft mechanic accepts a job at a major airline, he
knows that there are certain restrictions put on his life, especially with regards to
alcohol and drugs. Even without an LCA, there are numerous drugs, both over-
the-counter and prescription, that a mechanic is not permitted to take while he is at
work. Among some of the most common are cold and allergy medications. In
this particular case, it is likely that pursuant to Federal Aviation Administration
regulations, Johnson should not have taken the cough medicine and went to work
anyway, even without the LCA agreement between himself and Continental.
159
Additionally, the LCA was very specific about what Johnson needed to do in or-
der to take medications and still come to work. 16 Those were the terms that John-
son and Continental agreed to in order to allow him to continue working at Conti-
nental.' 61
The airline industry must be confident that the terms of its LCA agreements
will be upheld. This encourages an airline to strive to work with an employee and
give him one more chance, rather than simply firing him. Additionally, employ-
ees will be more apt to follow the terms of the LCA, if they know that the LCA





159. Not knowing exactly which medication he took, this cannot be said for sure. Per the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs), both airline mechanics and airline pilots are required to ensure that any
medication they are taking is approved by the FAA prior to reporting to work.
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and employers. If the terms of LCAs are not upheld, companies are less likely to
use LCAs and more likely to just fire the employee. When an employee in the
airline industry has done something that would permit a company to fire him, the
terms that the company agrees to bring him back under must be followed. This is
critically important because of the many public policy issues at play, the first and
foremost of which is the safety of the public. An airline agrees to LCA terms
because it feels public safety will not be compromised by allowing the employee
to continue to work for the company, as long as the terms of the LCA are fol-
lowed. Second guessing an airline on this issue could seriously compromise pub-
lic safety. Therefore, the terms of an LCA must be followed and the LCA should
be exactly that for an employee-his "last chance." The LCA is the bargain the
two parties struck which both felt they could live with and should be upheld.
Airlines should not be forced to compromise safety by being ordered to give an
employee yet another chance, an employee who has not been willing to follow the
terms which the company felt were necessary in order to keep from compromising
public safety.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this case, the Fifth Circuit looked at two issues. 162 The first issue the court
addressed was what the appropriate standard of review was for reviewing arbitra-
tion awards, specifically in cases governed by the RLA. The court held that the
standard of review was one of deference to the interpretation of the arbitrator.'
63
Additionally, the court looked at whether the district court erred in upholding the
award of the arbitrator. The court held that the district court did err.' The court
found this particular case was a rare example of an appropriate time for a court to
overturn the decision of an arbitrator. 65 The court stated that the Board's inter-
pretation of the LCA was not an arguable construction of it and therefore, the
Board had exceeded the scope of it jurisdiction when it determined the award. 166
KATHLEEN BIRKHOFER
162. Id.
163. ld. at 619.
164. Id.
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